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THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, UNNECESSARY,
AND UNHELPFUL
by Robert F. Turner*
Perhaps the most confident judgment one can make about the War
Powers Resolution is that several of its most fundamental provisions
are flagrantly unconstitutional. The Founding Fathers established a
complex system of checks and balances based on co-equal, separate,
and independent political branches. Even recognizing the existence of
ambiguity concerning the precise limits of executive and legislative au-
thority pertaining to the use of force abroad, it does not follow that
either branch has the unilateral power to determine the limits of the
other's authority. Attempts by Congress to modify its constitutional
relationship with the executive branch by simple statute have been
firmly rejected by the United States Supreme Court in the past.'
Specifically with respect to the War Powers Resolution, there are
at least four serious constitutional problems inherent in three provi-
sions of the statute:
(1) Although during the evacuation of Indochina and the Maya-
guez rescue operation many members of Congress-including some
key sponsors of the War Powers Resolution-acknowledged that the
President had independent constitutional authority as Commander-in-
Chief to rescue endangered United States citizens abroad,2 the specific
* Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative and Intergovernmental
Affairs. The writer chairs the Committee on Executive Congressional Relations of the
American Bar Association's section on International Law and Practice, and recently au-
thored The War Powers Resolution: Its Implementation in Theory and Practice (1983) from
which this article is extracted. Reprinted through the permission of the Foreign Policy Re-
search Institute, Philadelphia, Penn., © 1983. The author wishes to emphasize that he is
solely responsible for the opinions expressed and the accuracy of facts stated. This article
does not necessarily represent the views of the United States government or the American
Bar Association.
1. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
2. Professor Alexander Bickel qualified his statement of the Resolution by saying:
I don't think the President can be deprived of his power to respond to attacks and
threats against our troops wherever they may be, as well as against our territory; or
of the power to contribute to see to the safety of our troops once they are engaged,
even if a statutory period has expired.
Cruden, The War-Making Process, 69 MILITARY L. REV. 35, 109 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Cruden].
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language of section 2(c) of the Resolution asserts that this power is lim-
ited to "a national emergency created by attack upon the United States,
its territories or possessions, or its armed forces." Any attempt to give
legal effect to this provision would be patently unconstitutional.
3
(2) Section 5(b) of the Resolution would deprive the President of
his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief during a period of
hostilities after a period of sixty days if the Congress remained silent on
the matter. (The President would be permitted to act as Commander-
in-Chief for an extra thirty days in order to protect United States forces
in the process of withdrawal from hostilities.) Hostilities by United
States forces could be continued only if Congress affirmatively acted to
authorize their use. The idea that Congress can by silence or inaction
deprive the President of a fundamental expressed constitutional
power-in a time of national emergency, no less-is incompatible with
our system of separation of powers.
(3) Section 5(c) of the Resolution would allow the Congress to
deprive the President of his Commander-in-Chief powers at any time
simply by passing a concurrent resolution. Such a resolution does not
have the effect of law (and even a statute could not deprive the Presi-
dent of his independent constitutional powers), because it is not sub-
mitted to the President for his signature or veto as required by the
Constitution's presentation clause. This constitutional difficulty was
recognized by many congressional supporters of the resolution and by
eminent constitutional scholars who testified in favor of war powers
legislation during congressional hearings on the subject.4 Similarly,
there is a danger that in practice the Congress would use the "silent
veto" power to dictate the tactical conduct of military operations-an
infringement of both the President's Commander-in-Chief power and
his authority as Chief Executive of the nation. For the first reason,
section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution is unconstitutional on its
face. For the second, it is incompatible with the spirit of the
Constitution.'
3. Although Senator Javits took the position that § 2(c) was an operative part of the
Resolution, Cruden, supra note 2, at 80, the Department of State legal adviser has argued
that it was "at most a declaratory statement of policy." Id There is, however, a public
perception that this language is a legally binding constraint upon the President's authority.
See, e.g., U.S.A. Today, Dec. 30, 1982, at I, which, in summarizing major provisions of the
Resolution, stated that the "President can send U.S. troops to hostile areas, but only when
war is declared, when authorized by law or in a national emergency."
4. See Cruden, supra note 2, at 103-04; H.R. REP. No. 547 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16,
18-20, reprintedin 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2358-63 (supplemental and minority
views).
5. The United States Supreme Court seems to agree. In INS v. Chadha, - U.S. -
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That these rather apparent constitutional difficulties were ignored
by enough members of both the House and Senate to override a presi-
dential veto may be explained in part, perhaps, by Senator Javits' ex-
pectation that the White House would agree to a "methodology" for
involving the Congress in decisions to commit United States forces to
combat and that the resulting document would thus "represent a com-
pact between Congress and the President for making the Constitution
work in what is generally admitted to be a gray area."6 Under this
"compact" theory it might be contended that at least some of the con-
stitutional difficulties would not be present, since one branch would not
be imposing its interpretation on the other. While this might success-
fully have established a working methodology for the duration of the
Nixon Administration, even under a "compact" theory it could not be
held to bind succeeding Presidents (any more than Congress could by
statute prohibit a subsequent Congress from enacting a new statute tak-
ing a contrary position). Article five of the Constitution sets forth vari-
ous procedures for amending the Constitution, but nowhere is it
provided that the acquiescence of one President can alter the constitu-
tional authority of a successor in office. While a "Ninety-third Con-
gress-President Nixon methodology" might have been useful and fully
acceptable to a future Commander-in-Chief, it would not be legally
binding.
Political considerations also helped to obscure some of the consti-
tutional objections to the Resolution-particularly after it had been ve-
toed by President Nixon, The vote to override the veto was taken in
the wake of the firing of Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox,
and senators were quoted as saying, for example: "This is not the time
to support Nixon"; "We simply have to slap Nixon down, and this is
the vote to do it on"; and "I love the Constitution, but I hate Nixon
more."
7
Even were there no constitutional difficulties with the War Powers
Resolution, a review of its implementation during the past nine years
demonstrates that it has been as ineffective in practice as it is unwise in
theory. Congress lacks the expertise to deal hurriedly with complex
foreign policy emergencies, and most members are too busy with other
103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), the Court stated that the legislative branch cannot subject legislation
to additional procedural requirements such as approval by a majority of both houses, thus
creating a congressional veto on the executive's power. Id at 2784-87.
6. P. HOLT, THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN U.S. ARMED
INTERVENTION 2 (1978) (emphasis added).
7. Cruden, supra note 2, at 75.
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duties to remain up-to-date on even a prolonged crisis. During times of
crisis, decisiveness is often essential. Failure will almost be guaranteed
if there are 536 potential secretaries of state trying to make decisions by
consensus. Congress is not structured to make rapid decisions, and the
more controversial and important the decision, the more likely it is that
at least some members will want to prolong the debate to avoid having
to take a position that might later prove to have been politically
unwise.
The experience during the Indochina evacuations provides a good
example. President Ford asked the Congress on April 10, 1975, to
quickly consider and clarify his authority to carry out a humanitarian
evacuation. He requested action within nine days and was promised
expeditious consideration, but nearly three weeks later Congress was
still debating as communist troops overran the last areas of Indochina.
As the last congressional staff member evacuated from Saigon during
the final days of April 1975, I am particularly grateful that President
Ford decided to proceed with the evacuation on his own authority.
Another individual might have found it more politically expedient to
continue beseeching Congress for authorization legislation, and then to
point the finger of blame at the Democrat-controlled Congress for fail-
ing to act to prevent hundreds of Americans from being seized by
Vietnamese communist forces.
There is no guarantee that in a future crisis another United States
President would act with the same degree of courage displayed in 1975
by President Ford. After the failure of President Carter's attempted
Iranian resbue there were calls for his impeachment for violating the
War Powers Resolution, and during hearings in the House Committee
on International Relations following the Korean tree trimming incident
in 1976 it was asserted that if in the future a President did not comply
with the provisions of the resolution: "We will have to get a new
President."9
8. Because of these institutional shortcomings, furthermore, unless substantial changes
are made in the way Congress deals with national security problems, increasing the role of
Congress in crisis management will, of necessity, amount to increasing the influence of con-
gressional staff members. If these individuals are to be provided the detailed and sensitive
intelligence data necessary to make sound recommendations, recent experience suggests that
much of the information will be either intentionally or inadvertently disclosed. See infra
text accompanying notes 45-59. The end result will likely be compromised intelligence ca-
pabilities since foreign assets and intelligence sources will be unwilling to provide informa-
tion to a government that has demonstrated an inability to protect secrets.
9. Deaths ofAmerican Military Personnel in the Korean Demilitarized Zone, 1976: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on International Political and Military Affairs and Organizations of
the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1976) (statement of
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The requirement that the President must obtain congressional au-
thorization or terminate hostilities after a sixty-day period may also
prove to be mischievous in practice. It might encourage a President to
escalate a conflict unnecessarily-with accompanying increased loss of
life and property on all sides-in order to try to achieve a quick victory.
President Nixon's fear that Congress would soon enact legislation ter-
minating United States involvement in Indochina, for example, was a
factor in the decision to bomb the Hanoi area in December 1972:
"Faced with a perceived deadline in Congress and continued intransi-
gence in both Saigon and Hanoi, the President's instincts were for a
massive post-election escalation of the conflict to force North Vietnam
to an agreement."' 10 While in the view of many (including myself) this
was also a sound decision on military grounds, irrespective of possible
congressional action, the fact remains that ideally such decisions
should not be influenced by extrinsic domestic political considerations.
Alternatively, such a requirement might encourage an enemy to be
more recalcitrant in the hope that by holding out a few weeks longer
Congress would undercut the President's ability to prosecute the action.
In such a situation, the President might conclude that it was necessary
to make major concessions and sacrifice substantial United States inter-
ests in order to negotiate a quick truce and avoid the risk of having his
commander-in-chief powers withdrawn and losing everything to the
enemy.
Something of an analogy can be found in the experience of French
Socialist Premier Pierre Mend~s-France, who announced in June 1954
that he would resign if he did not succeed in arranging a cease-fire in
Indochina by July 20 of that year. The communist delegations at the
Geneva Conference realized that the longer they stalled the more con-
cessions he would be willing to make to preserve his job. The serious
negotiations took place during the final hours of July 20, and shortly
before midnight the wall clock was unplugged to permit the French
delegation to make a few more concessions within the artificial time
deadline.II Another, more recent, example of the harmful effects of an
artificial negotiating deadline can be found in a review of the back-
ground to the Panama Canal treaties. Because President Carter re-
Dante Fascell, Chairman, Subcomm. on International Political and Military Affairs and
Organizations).
10. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: A SPECIAL STUDY OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS, 103-04 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as SULLIVAN STUDY].
11. R. TURNER, VIETNAMESE COMMUNISM: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 87, 96,
269 (1975) [hereinafter cited as TURNER ON VIETNAM].
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fused to submit the nomination of his negotiator (Sol Linowitz) to the
Senate for confirmation, by law the appointment could not extend be-
yond a period of six months. 12 The treaties, which were filled with seri-
ous ambiguities, were agreed upon six months to the day after the
appointment was made. 3
The War Powers Resolution might contribute to unnecessarily
high United States casualties in other ways as well. Writing in the Oc-
tober 1980 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette, Major A. J. Ponnwitz
argued: "An enemy who knows a withdrawal is imminent has most of
the information necessary to prevent the success of the military mis-
sion, or at least, to inflict severe casualties on the retreating forces."' 4
In addition, the Resolution encourages the President to commit United
States military personnel into potentially dangerous situations-where
involvement in hostilities is possible but not so clearly indicated by the
circumstances as to invoke section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolu-
tion-either unarmed (as in the Zaire airlift and the 1976 evacuation of
Lebanon), or inadequately armed for effective self-defense (as may be
the case in El Salvador'-), so as to avoid the provisions of section
12. Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-352, § 107, 86 Stat. 489
(1972) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 3942 (1980)).
13. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95TH CONG., 2D SEss., RE-
PORT ON PANAMA CANAL TREATIES 198-99 (Comm. Print 1978) (minority views); 124
CONG. REC. 2945 (1978); PANAMA CANAL TREATIES: THE LEGAL ISSUES 105-18 (J. Himmer
ed. 1979) (comments of R. Turner).
14. Ponnwitz, Limited War and the War Powers Resolution, 1980 MARINE CORPS GA-
ZETTE 40.
15. The State Department announced that because United States soldiers in El Salvador
were armed with "personal sidearms, which they are only authorized to use in their own
defense or the defense of other Americans," they were not equipped for combat and thus
§ 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution did not apply. 127 CONG. REC. E901 (daily ed.
March 5, 1981) (statement of Rep. Broomfield). A minor scandal occurred when United
States journalists videotaped three United States soldiers carrying M-16 rifles in El Salva-
dor. Lescazer, Reagan Callsfor Full Report on Armed Team in Salvador, WASH. POST., Feb.
13, 1982, Part A, at 1, col. 1. For violating their orders, the following day the senior officer
in the group was ordered out of El Salvador by the United States ambassador, and the other
soldiers received official reprimands. Dickey, US. Colonel Told to Leave Salvador, WASH.
POST, Feb. 14, 1982, Part A, at 1, col. 1. Following testimony before the Foreign Relations
Committee, the State Department in 1982 responded to this written question submitted for
the record:
Question 38. Do U.S. military trainers now in El Salvador carry M-16 rifles?
Is consideration being given to permitting those personnel to do so? Would such a
decision require reporting under any existing provisions?
Answer. U.S. military security assistance personnel are not authorized to carry
weapons other than individual side arms in the field in El Salvador. The question
of security of all USG [United States government] personnel is of course under
continuing review. Should it be determined at some point that under certain cir-
cumstances, weapons other than individual side arms would be authorized. Con-
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4(a)(2). Rules prohibiting United States military personnel from enter-
ing certain areas or accompanying host-nation troops on "offensive"
operations may help to reduce the likelihood of their direct involve-
ment in hostilities; but requiring that, if attacked, they defend them-
selves with rocks or other inadequate weapons makes little sense and
should be unacceptable as a matter of national policy.
Even the formal reporting requirement, which was unchallenged
by President Nixon or any of his successors-is not without risks. Sen-
ate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Tower has observed:
Although the act does not specify whether the report to Con-
gress must be unclassified, there remains the possibility that a
confidential report would become public knowledge. In many
cases the more urgent the requirement that a decision remain
confidential, the greater the pressures for disclosure. Thus, by
notifying Congress of the size, disposition and objectives of
U.S. forces dispatched in a crisis, we run the risk that the re-
port may get into the public domain. If this information be-
comes available to the enemy, he then knows exactly what he
can expect from American forces and thus what risks he runs
in countering American actions. This removes any element of
surprise the U.S. forces might have enjoyed and eliminates
any uncertainties the adversary might have as to American
plans.'6
The War Powers Resolution has been heralded as the answer to
future "Vietnams."' Never again, it was said, would a President be
able to commit United States soldiers to foreign wars without congres-
sional participation in the decisionmaking process. While perhaps re-
assuring to the uninformed constituents of some congressmen, this
rationale bore little resemblance to historical reality. Writing in the
Virginia Law Review, Yale law professor (and former Undersecretary
of State for political affairs) Eugene Rostow observed:
During the war in Vietnam... we experienced naked polit-
gress would be consulted as appropriate and all applicable laws would be complied
with.
United States Policy in the Western Hemisphere, 1982: Hearings on SJ. Res. 144, S. 2179 &
amend 1334, S. 2243, S. 2370 Before the Senate Comm on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 99 (1982) (State Department's Responses to Questions Submitted for the Record fol-
lowing testimony of Stephen Bosworth, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Af-
fairs, Department of State).
16. Tower, Congress Versus the President: The Formulation and Implementation ofAmer-
ican Foreign Policy, 60 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 229, 239 (1981).
17. Cruden, supra note 2, at 35; Chi. Tribune, Sept. 23, 1982.
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ical irresponsibility. First, the President and Congress, acting
together in a constitutional mode that goes back to the time of
Washington, made a series of decisions involving us in the
war. . . . Later, when the war. . . became unpopular, many
of the congressmen who had voted and voted and voted for
[it] suddenly began to say that [it was] all the President's fault.
They claimed that the President had involved the country in
war through stealth and concealment. . . . Then, having cre-
ated the myth of presidential usurpation, Congress passed the
War Powers Resolution to cure the imaginary disease.18
Perhaps the greatest irony of the War Powers Resolution is that,
despite its unconstitutional infringement upon the authority of the
President, it would not have prevented the war in Vietnam had it been
in effect in the early 1960's. In compliance with section 2(c)(2) of the
Resolution, the use of United States Armed Forces in Indochina was
clearly done pursuant to "specific statutory authorization." Further,
there was sufficient consultation to satisfy the mandate of section 3, and
the reporting requirements of section 4 would not even arguably have
influenced the likely course of events.' 9 Finally, it was not until the
1970's-many years after the commitment had been made and the
troops deployed-that a majority could be mustered in Congress to
limit funding for the war, much less direct that the troops be
withdrawn.
Many "lessons," of course, can be drawn from our Vietnam expe-
rience-but only a few are legitimate. Those legislators who reflexively
cry "no more Vietnams" each time the president exercises the national
muscle might benefit from a re-examination of Vietnam, and particu-
larly the role Congress played. Perhaps the United States was doomed
to failure in Indochina-we will never know. But the war was not lost
militarily on the battlefield; it was lost in Washington when a frustrated
18. Rostow, Response [to Henkin, "' More Effective System"for Foreign Relations.- The
Constitutional Framework, 61 VA. L. REv. 751 (1975)], 61 VA. L. REV. 797, 801-02 (1975).
19. Graham Allison has argued:
Would the [War Powers] Resolution have prevented the massive Americanization
of the [Vietnam] war that occurred in 1965? The answer is no .... Most Ameri-
cans supported the war effort in 1965 .... It seems fairly certain that, if President
Johnson had reported to Congress as required by the Resolution shortly after the
initiation of sustained United States bombing of the North or the introduction of
regular United States combat troops in the South, Congress would have speedily
authorized a continuation of the war.
Allison, Making War: The President and Congress, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 95 (1976). Rob-
ert Scigliano takes a similar position. Scigliano, he War Powers Resolution and the War
Powers, THE PRESIDENCY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 117 (M. Bessett & J. Tulis ed.
1981).
[Vol. 17
SYMPOSIUM
Congress terminated funding. There are, no doubt, individuals who
sincerely believe Congress acted wisely, but the consequences of the
communist victory that followed in Indochina have been significant.
To mention but a few:
(1) The fall of the United States-supported governments did not
bring the much-heralded peace. On the contrary, there is evidence that
more people may have died in the first three or four years of so-called
peace in tiny Cambodia alone than were killed on all sides throughout
Indochina during thirteen years of war.
(2) The "National Liberation Front" and "third-force" elements
touted by congressional doves were promptly shoved aside by Hanoi's
legions, who ruled Saigon as an occupational army following its
"liberation."
(3) The people of Vietnam are in a far worse position today than
they were a decade ago. 20 Corruption and mismanagement have re-
sulted in economic disaster, and human rights have deteriorated dra-
matically. There are more political prisoners, elections are far less free,
there are fewer newespapers (none opposing the regime), and unap-
proved books have been publicly burned. Apparently to repay the So-
viets for their extensive economic aid, thousands of Vietnamese
workers have been shipped to the Soviet Union to work as laborers.
(4) Since "liberation," more than a million people have risked
robbery, rape, and even death (some experts estimate that boat people
have no more than a fifty-fifty chance of surviving the ordeal) to flee
the new Gulag that Vietnam has become.
(5) United States interests in the region have suffered as well.
Today Hanoi is closely allied with Moscow, and is providing the Soviet
navy with access to extremely valuable port facilities along the south-
ern coast of Vietnam. The new Vietnamese army is the third largest in
the world (the United States Army ranks fifth).
If the War Powers Resolution does not resolve the conflict in legis-
lative-executive relations regarding the use of force, what principles
should govern the conduct of the two political branches in the national
security policymaking process? Is there a solution, given the admitted
ambiguities of the Constitution on this question? Probably so. At least
there are steps that could be taken by both branches to substantially
20. As this study was going to press, the United States Department of State submitted its
annual human rights survey to Congress, as required by law. The report concluded that of
all the countries surveyed, Vietnam was "the worst country to live in." Wash. Times, Feb. 9,
1983.
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reduce the likelihood of disasters in legislative-executive relations such
as were witnessed during the early and mid 1970's.
To begin with, each branch should recognize that the other has a
fully legitimate role to play, and that no policy will succeed in the long
run without the support of both branches. This is certainly true when
the policy in question might involve a commitment of armed forces to
hostilities. Taylor Reveley was certainly right when, in his recent book,
War Powers of the President and Congress, he observed that "the Con-
stitution does impose one iron demand on the President and Congress:
that they cooperate if any sustained venture for war or peace is to suc-
ceed."'" It hardly needs to be observed that, as a practical matter, Con-
gress-despite its powers to declare war (subject to a presidential
veto)-cannot effectively engage United States military forces in hostil-
ities without the cooperation of the Commander-in-Chief. This was
illustrated in the late nineteenth century when a lame-duck President
Grover Cleveland kept Congress from declaring war against Spain un-
til a more cooperative President McKinley assumed power. Robert
McElroy, in his 1923 biography of Cleveland, gives this account:
A number of Congressional leaders called on President
Cleveland to discuss an "important matter."
They said, "We have about decided to declare war
against Spain over the Cuban question. Conditions are
intolerable."
Mr. Cleveland drew himself up and said, "There will be
no war with Spain over Cuba while I am President."
One of the members flushed up and said angrily, "Mr.
President, you seem to forget that the Constitution of the
United States gives Congress the right to declare war."
He answered, "Yes, but it also makes me Commander-
in-Chief, and I will not mobilize the army. I happen to know
that we can buy the Island of Cuba from Spain for
$100,000,000, and a war will cost vastly more than that and
will entail another long list of pensioners. It would be an out-
rage to declare war."
The project died.22
Given the Vietnam experience, it should be even less necessary to
21. W. T. REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS
THE ARROW AND OLIVE BRANCH? 49 (1981).
22. R. McELROY, GROVER CLEVELAND, THE MAN AND THE STATESMAN 249-50 (1923),
quoted in Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEx. L. REV. 833,
867 (1972).
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emphasize the necessity of congressional cooperation in formulating
policies involving the use of military force. In many instances, of
course, a congressional role is mandated by the Constitution. But even
were this not the case, in the long run congressional support is essential.
First of all, even if the Commander-in-Chief already has a sufficient
army and navy, for extended hostilities he will need congressional ap-
propriations to purchase fuel and ammunition. More important, mem-
bers who feel that Congress has been cut out of the decision-making
process will be more likely to take their case to the people, and the
resulting display of disunity will endanger public support and ad-
versely affect the morale of our soldiers and the policies of our friends
and foes alike. We need look back no further than Vietnam to realize
the decisive role that these psychological factors can play.23
Accepting the practical utility-indeed, the necessity-of effective
cooperation between the political branches on policy questions involv-
ing the use of armed force, we must at the same time recognize the
difficulty of trying to consult seriously during a period of crisis prior to
making a decision. Certainly the President cannot be expected to talk
individually with all 535 members of Congress, and at times events
move so quickly that even the best-intentioned Commander-in-Chief
can do little more than instruct his staff to keep congressional leaders
informed. This is what consultation has come to mean in practice
under the War Powers Resolution, but it is far less than Congress has a
right to expect if the crisis is foreseeable. The solution may be for the
two branches to maintain sufficiently close contacts on a regular basis
so that, when an emergency requiring an immediate response does con-
front the President, he can take probable congressional attitudes into
account from the start. When appropriate, of course, he would still
need to seek formal congressional approval or authorization. But by
maintaining continuous and close consultation with Congress, he
would lessen the likelihood of being surprised by subsequent criticism
and at the same time would be less likely to leave Congress with the
feeling that it had been ignored.
It should be noted that consultation can take many forms. At least
as important as formal hearings and sessions with congressional leaders
in the White House are the more numerous informal exchanges that
occur when administration officials encounter members of Congress at
cocktail parties and in other off-the-record settings. 24 Although there
23. See TURNER ON VIETNAM, supra note 11, at 80-81, 85-86, 247-55.
24. See J. LEHMAN, THE EXECUTIVE, CONGRESS, AND FOREIGN POLICY: STUDIES OF
THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION 223-24 (1974).
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are risks involved-given the competing demands on a congressman's
time and the instrumental role played by congressional staff members
in the national security field, particularly when the subject matter is
technical or the issues are highly complex-it is important for the exec-
utive branch to maintain regular contacts with key congressional staff
members. This not only increases the likelihood that the administra-
tion will be aware of areas of special congressional concern, but also
serves to better inform Congress about administration programs and
policies.
The Constitution requires that the President, executive-branch of-
ficers, and all members of Congress take an oath of office to "support"
or "defend" the Constitution of the United States. This should be kept
in mind by both sides when issues of constitutional consequence are
under consideration. During my years as a Senate staff member, on
several occasions I heard other staff members, and even senators, assert
that it was for the courts, not Congress, to worry about whether a stat-
ute was constitutional. This is not a responsible attitude. True, some
issues are so complex that even constitutional scholars differ as to
where fine lines should be drawn (or if they should be drawn at all).
But ideally, in these gray areas, neither branch should seek to provoke
a confrontation with the other.
In this regard, the executive branch could well be guided by the
legacy of President Jefferson in his dealings with the Barbary powers.
Although war had been declared by the Bey of Tripoli and the opinion
was widespread that in such a circumstance the President needed no
additional authority to initiate offensive hostilities, Jefferson neverthe-
less deferentially sought formal authorization from Congress to carry
on the campaign. The guiding rule for the executive branch was ex-
pressed well by Alexander Hamilton, who wrote: "In so delicate a case,
in one which involves so important a consequence as that of war-my
opinion is that no doubtful authority ought to be exercised by the
President. "25
If Jefferson should be the model for the executive branch, the Con-
gress could learn from the late Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, who
served as President Pro Tempore of the Senate, chaired its Foreign Re-
lations Committee, and worked closely with the Truman Administra-
tion to forge a bipartisan consensus on foreign policy. In a 1947 speech
to the Cleveland Council of World Affairs, Senator Vandenberg said:
25. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (May 17, 1798) (emphasis ad-
ded), quoted in Scigliano, supra note 19, at 140.
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"This [bipartisanship] does not mean that we cannot have earnest, hon-
est, even vehement domestic differences of opinion on foreign policy.
It is no curb on free opinion or free speech. But it does mean that they
should not root themselves in partisanship. We should ever strive to
hammer out a permanent American foreign policy, in basic essentials,
which serves all America. 26
On domestic issues, Senator Vandenberg was capable of being as
partisan as most of his colleagues. No doubt he would have enjoyed
watching the other party squirm on foreign policy matters as well, but
he knew the extreme importance of national unity in facing a shrinking
world. He once said: "In the face of any foreign problem, our unity is
as important as our atomic bombs," 27 and in one of his last public
speeches-a Lincoln Day address in Detroit on February 10, 1949-he
looked toward the future:
It will be a sad hour for the Republic if we ever desert the
fundamental concept that politics shall stop at the water's
edge. It will be a triumphant day for those who would divide
and conquer us if we abandon the quest for a united voice
when America demands peace with honor in the world. In
my view nothing has happened to absolve either Democrats
or Republicans from continuing to put their country first.
Those who don't will serve neither their party nor
themselves. 8
In the sphere of foreign policy, where national unity is of such
great importance, the President has a special status. As the Supreme
Court noted in United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., he is "the
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international rela-
tions."2 9 He has an obligation to weigh the opinions of Congress and
needs the affirmative approval of Congress to implement many poli-
cies; but no matter how hard he tries, if the issue is controversial, he
cannot satisfy the wishes of all of the 535 members of the House and
Senate. Not infrequently, the professional judgments of his advisers
may lead him to pursue strategies that would not be chosen by a major-
ity of the Congress. But so long as the President is pursuing policy
26. Address by Senator Vandenberg, Cleveland Council of World Affairs (Jan. 11,
1947), quoted in 122 CONG. REc. 31,778 (1976).
27. Radio address by Senator Vandenberg, Detroit (Feb. 10, 1949), quotedin 122 CoNG.
REC. 31,778 (1976).
28. Address by Senator Vandenberg, Detroit (Feb. 10, 1949), quoted in 122 CONG. REC.
31,778 (1976).
29. 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
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goals shared by the Congress and the American people, he should be
allowed substantial flexibility in his choice of tactics.
President Lincoln once observed: "In a storm at sea, no one on
board can wish the ship to sink, and yet not infrequently all go down
together because too many will direct and no single mind will be al-
lowed to control. ' 30 In a similar vein, two years after leaving office
Thomas Jefferson wrote:
Leave the President free to choose his own coadjutors, to pur-
sue his own measures, and support him and them, even if we
think we are wiser than they, honester that they are, or pos-
sessing more enlarged information of the state of things. If we
move in mass, be it ever so circuitously, we shall attain our
object; but if we break into squads, every one pursuing the
path he thinks most direct, we become an easy conquest to
those who can now barely hold us in check. I repeat again,
that we ought not to schismatize on either men or measures.
Principles alone can justify that.
3 '
The proper congressional role in national security matters should
be that of a full partner in the formulation of general principles and
policies, rather than that of a micro-manager or second-guesser of the
President's execution of those policies. Certainly the initiation of sig-
nificant offensive hostilities is such a policy decision, which under our
constitutional system of government should not be made without the
approval of Congress. But more detailed questions of how many and
which forces to use, and how best to employ them, are beyond both the
expertise and the constitutional jurisdiction of the legislative branch.
Similarly, the recent practice of globe-trotting congressmen traveling to
international crisis spots to negotiate with foreign leaders-unless ex-
pressly authorized by the President-would have shocked the Found-
ing Fathers and is a gross infringement on the constitutional authority
of the President.32
Clearly there are substantial benefits to be gained by presenting a
30. Address by President Lincoln, quotedin 122 CONG. Rc. 31,778 (1976).
31. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel William Duane (March 28, 1811), reprinted
in A. KOCH & W. PEDEN, THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 613
(1944).
32. In addition, some such activities may well be felonies under the Logan Act, 18
U.S.C. § 953 (1976), which provides in part that
any citizen of the United States, whoever he may be, who, without authority of the
United States, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any correspondence
or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, with
intent to influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government or of any
office or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United
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united foreign policy to the world. It is difficult to prove conclusively,
but a strong case can be made that the divisiveness in United States
foreign policy during the 1970's was instrumental in Hanoi's decision
to escalate the fighting in South Vietnam, 33 and in Moscow's decision
to deploy Cuban soldiers to seize control of the Angolan revolution.34
There may be some issues of principle on which agreement cannot be
reached and regarding which bipartisan cooperation will prove impos-
sible-but cooperation should always be the goal. This can only work,
however, if both branches, and both political parties, make a full com-
mitment to pursuing that goal in good faith.
While in practice the first step-legitimate consultation with the
Congress-may belong to the President, in reality the controlling deci-
sion belongs to the congressional opposition. As Senator Vandenberg
observed:
Since the Constitution charges the President with pri-
mary responsibility in international relations, it is he who
must start the process and set its boundaries. But in the final
analysis the Congressional "opposition" decides whether
there shall be cooperation. We cooperated. I express the be-
lief that our patriotic Democratic friends will follow this ex-
ample when they are in the "opposition.
35
Unfortunately, those in opposition have the greatest incentives to-
ward partisanship. Furthering the interests of their own candidates-
or in many cases their own candidacy-is not accomplished by making
the incumbent President look good; and, realistically, he is likely to get
most of the public credit for successes. Even ignoring these considera-
tions, there are substantial pressures on a congressman to undercut
presidential foreign policy initiatives. For example, experience shows
that the press gives more attention to the critics than to the supporters
of national policy, and in politics press exposure can often be directly
States or to defeat the measures of the United States, shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
33. See TURNER ON VIETNAM, supra note 11, at 247-55.
34. Consider this sequence of events. On November 24, 1975, Secretary of State Kis-
singer denounced Soviet "adventurism" in Angola and warned that continued intervention
would not be tolerated. On December 9, President Ford made a similar statement and
called for an end to all external assistance to Angola. The Soviet airlift of military equip-
ment and Cuban troops to Angola ceased until December 19, when the United States Senate
voted 54-22 to prohibit further covert assistance to any faction in Angola. The Soviets im-
mediately resumed their airlift, and within about two weeks had doubled the number of
Cuban troops in Angola. For information on this period, see H. KISSINGER, AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 317-19 (3d ed. 1977).
35. 122 CONG. REc. 31,778 (1976) (statement of Sen. Vandenberg).
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translated into votes. Furthermore, many foreign policy issues are of
greater interest to a small but vocal ethnic, religious, or other special-
interest group than to the population in general.36 Senator Tower has
observed that "to the extent that Congress often represents competing
regional and parochial interests, it is almost impossible for it to forge a
unified national foreign policy strategy and to speak with one voice in
negotiating with foreign powers.
37
The influence of ethnic pressures was very apparent during the
Cyprus crisis in the mid 1970's. I heard several congressmen and sena-
tors say, in effect, "Don't talk to me about the strategic importance of
Turkey-I don't have any Turkish restaurants in my district." Issues of
war and peace are particularly susceptible to this sort of pressure-few
intelligent legislators enjoy casting votes that may cost the lives of the
sons and daughters of voting constituents. Thus the safest vote for an
individual congressman often becomes the most dangerous for the na-
tion-a vote of partisan dissention during a period of national crisis.
There is a special irony here, in that while the congressman by his dis-
sension is absolving himself from the consequences, the divisiveness he
helps to create may be a central factor in encouraging the enemy to
escalate the conflict-resulting in an even greater number of United
States casualties.
In his 1975 Virginia Law Review article, Eugene Rostow wrote:
When the Executive Branch deals with congressmen and sen-
ators who continue to vote for a war and then say, "there's no
one here but us chickens" after the war becomes unpopular, a
mode of suspicion develops which is rather hard to allay. I
personally have dealt with congressmen and senators about
Vietnam, often reminding them that the Administration had
36. John Lehman writes:
It is a fact of life that there is virtually no political profit for a Congressman in the
serious pursuit of foreign affairs. The role of critic after the fact, or of dramatic
accuser, however, can produce useful publicity. And a latent American exaspera-
tion with "foreigners" has often exerted an obvious influence on Congressional
action, especially when coupled with the political requirements of domestic and
constituent concerns. Every member must stay close to the latter concerns. Only
in the absence of opposition interest, or consensus back home can a legislator be
free to judge an issue by the larger national interest-and only then if he is free of
the party whip, the pressure of a vital lobby, or of committee loyalties. Most re-
grettable of all, Congress is particularly vulnerable to the powerful narrow interest
lobbies: not merely the sordid black bag of the industry and labor lobbies, but
zealous forces of Common Cause, the Liberty Lobby, Reserve Officers Association,
Greek-Americans, and the Sierra Club, each stampeding vulnerable members to
their own narrow view of the national interest.
LEHMAN, supra note 24, at 28.
37. Tower, supra note 16, at 232.
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long been trying to achieve goals which they have recom-
mended in political speeches-reconvening the Geneva Con-
ference, for example. Typically, their response was, I know
that, but you must remember that I have to be elected in my
district. The President has to do what must be done. I must
take care of my reelection. In short, a great many men slith-
ered off the deck when the going got rough. 8
This attitude of political irresponsiblity was a central factor in the
creation of the War Powers Resolution-which was portrayed by many
in Congress as a means of insuring that a future President would not
bypass Congress as Johnson and Nixon had done in Vietnam. Con-
gressional irresponsibility has also been apparent in the implementa-
tion of the War Powers Resolution. With the possible exceptions of the
Indochina evacuations, providing a multinational force and observers
for the Sinai, and the first Lebanon deployment in 1982, none of the
instances examined in this study has been preceeded by the kind of
meaningful consultation envisioned in the Resolution. The stated pur-
pose of the Resolution (and presumably the consultation requirement)
is to "insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the
President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces
into hostilities." The President can hardly consider the "judgment" of
the Congress if his consultation amounts to having a staff member in-
form congressional leaders once a decision to act has been made and is
in the process of implementation.
Except for the fact that his action was permissible under his in-
dependent constitutional authority (and thus, as applied, the War Pow-
ers Resolution was unconstitutional), President Ford's use of force in
the Mayaguez affair appears to have been a violation of the consulta-
tion language of the resolution. During the same operation, the Presi-
dent violated the specific terms of the (unconstitutional) Cooper-
Church Amendment and its progeny by using United States Armed
Forces off the shores of Cambodia without specific congressional au-
thorization. And yet his operation was viewed by the American people
as a great success, and so liberals in the Congress generally praised his
performance. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee even went so
far as to unanimously adopt a resolution praising the rescue operation.
As the New York Times (which also praised the operation"g) observed:
"In the Mayaguez case, Mr. Ford believed he was required to consult
38. Rostow, supra note 18, at 802.
39. Afier Mayaguez, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1975, § 4, at 18, col. 2.
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with Congressional leaders before acting. He seems instead to have
informed them somewhat after the fact. Yet there was practically no
criticism on legal grounds probably for several reasons: Criticism at a
welcome moment of success would be politically risky at best."4
In contrast, President Carter failed to consult before starting the
first phase of his attempted rescue of United States citizens held hos-
tage in Iran-when there was no Cooper-Church-type restriction on
United States military activities in the region, and when complete se-
crecy was essential to any chance of success-and was sharply criti-
cized in the Congress and the press. His rescue attempt failed. It does
not seem unreasonable to expect the Congress to play by one set of
rules. Further, if it insists upon prior consultation, Congress must be
responsible enough not to leave the President swinging in the wind
nearly three weeks later-as occurred before the Saigon evacuation-
facing a crisis while Congress continues to debate. And if Congress
really doubts that the President has constitutional authority to rescue
endangered United States citizens in Indochina or Iran, it must apply
this principle uniformly without respect to the ultimate success or pop-
ularity of the president's actions.
Finally, if Congress contends that the President cannot rescue en-
dangered Americans without first securing formal authorization, it
must be prepared to accept greater responsibility for the fate of those
endangered citizens. Had President Ford accepted the argument of
many in Congress that he lacked authority to rescue the last Americans
from Phnom Penh because of the War Powers Resolution or other stat-
utory consfraints, and had those Americans suffered the fate of more
than a million Cambodians under the subsequent rule of Pol Pot, we
might wonder whether Congress would have willingly accepted any re-
sponsibility for their deaths.
For all of his faults and weaknesses-and I believe they were nu-
merous-President Johnson recognized the importance of congres-
sional participation in an effective foreign policy. He had, after all,
served for many years as majority leader of the Senate. Reflecting on
40. Ford Sends a Signal, N.Y. TIMEs, May 18, 1975, § 4, at I, col. 1. Foreign Relations
Committee staff director Pat Holt writes:
Although fighting was minimal and casualties were light, the evacuation [of Sai-
gon] clearly took place in a hostile environment and therefore put the President at
least technically in violation of the numerous limitations on using funds for mili-
tary activities in Vietnam. The evacuation was a violation, even by [State Depart-
ment legal adviser] Monroe Leigh's interpretation of April 16. . . . Nevertheless,
the evacuation could be counted an operational success, and there was little dispo-
sition in Congress to quibble.
HOLT, supra note 6, at 15-16.
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the failures of his Vietnam policy, he wrote in 1972: "I knew that if I
wanted Congress with me at the crash landing, they had to be with me
at the takeoff. But I forgot about the availability of parachutes."41
One of the more perceptive analyses of the congressional role in
foreign affairs was provided by Pat Holt, who spent thirty years on the
staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and was its staff
director at the time of the Indochina evacuations, the Mayaguez rescue,
and some of the other operations discussed in this study. He writes:
Senator Vandenberg said that Congress wanted to participate
in the takeoffs as well as the crash landings; actually it some-
times seems more interested in investigating crash landings
than in participating in takeoffs. Despite the fact that it was
clumsily executed, Mayaguez was a success, and there is little
political mileage to be gained in a post mortem of the rescue
of American citizens and the protection of freedom of the
seas.
After the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee held weeks of hearings
rehashing all the bad advice Kennedy had received and trying
to determine who had bungled what. After the success story
of the missile crisis in 1962, Secretary of State Dean Rusk all
but begged the Foreign Relations Committee to review-or
investigate, if you will--the administration's handling of it,
but no one was interested. The general principle seems to be
that success has few autopsies; the corpse of a failure is picked
to pieces.
42
The lessons of the congressional reaction to Vietnam and to vari-
ous incidents after the War Powers Resolution was adopted are not
encouraging. While the period may be historically atypical, during the
1970's Congress proved itself time and again to be a political creature
with a conveniently selective institutional memory. More often than
not, congressional attitudes toward specific situations appeared more
attuned to public opinion polls than to the requirements of the law or
the Constitution. Even after a commitment had been established by
treaty, authorized by joint resolution of Congress, and reaffirmed for
years by overwhelming congressional majorities through the appropria-
tion of funds4 3-as occurred in Vietnam-many members of Congress
41. Letter from President Johnson to Eugene Rostow (March 25, 1972), quoted in Ros-
tow, supra note 18, at 803.
42. HOLT, supra note 6, at 32-33.
43. Although § 8(a) of the War Powers Resolution denies that authority to commit
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found no difficulty in pretending that the President was solely responsi-
ble and that Congress had unconstitutionally been excluded from the
decision to commit troops. Yet, when the President did act essentially
alone, without consulting Congress, if the operation was perceived by
the public as a success, he was greeted with cheers.
If bipartisan cooperation in the formulation of national security
policy is going to work, Congress must commit itself in word and deed
to playing a more responsible role. The practice of undercutting the
President for partisan gain, or to placate a special-interest constituency,
is a luxury we can no longer afford if we are to have a viable foreign
policy.
The benefits to Congress of being a full partner in the formulation
of foreign and national security policy are significant, and those to the
American people are even greater; but they will not come cost free.
Members of Congress must be willing to devote substantially greater
time to keeping abreast of national security problems-time that will
directly gain them few, if any, votes, because often they will not even
be able to discuss the subject matter in public. Each hour spent in a
classified briefing is an hour that cannot be spent with constituents or
seeking newspaper headlines. Further, many of the briefings will be
uninteresting and will pertain to matters that might-but usually will
not-require formal congressional action or become issues of concern
for most Americans.
In past years, few members of Congress have been willing to take
troops to hostilities can be inferred "from any provisions of law. . . including any provision
contained in any appropriation Act," at the time of the Vietnam War this was not the law.
War Powers Resolution of 1973, § 8, 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1) (1976). In The Prize Cases, 67
U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670-71 (1863), the Supreme Court said that "if it were necessary to the
technical existence of a war, that it should have a legislative sanction, we find it in almost
every act passed at the extraordinary session of the Legislature of 1861." In more recent
cases (not related to the war powers), as well, the Court has held "the appropriation by
Congress of funds . . . stands as confirmation and ratification of the action of the Chief
Executive." Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111, 116 (1947). See
also Brooks v. Dewar, 313 U.S. 354, 361 (1941). Similarly, in 1981 the Supreme Court
found authority for presidential action in "the area of foreign policy and national security"
on the basis of the enactment of legislation closely related to the question of the President's
authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad
discretion-particularly where "there is a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct
of the sort engaged in by the President." Dames & Moore v. Regan, 435 U.S. 654, 678-79
(1981). See also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981). See SULLIVAN STUDY, supra note
10, at 4, which notes that during the Gulf of Tonkin hearings in 1964, Secretary of State
Rusk informed the Congress that the Administration regarded congressional appropriations
as authority for the Vietnam involvement. As a practical matter, such indirect approval is
not desirable, since for some members of Congress the approval of funds to permit deployed
soldiers to defend themselves would not imply approval of the actual deployment.
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time from their busy routines to attend such briefings. Former Na-
tional Security Council staffer Dr. John F. Lehman has noted:
Consultation as a process . . . requires as much active
involvement on the part of Congress as on the part of the Ex-
ecutive. Failure to consult is a constant complaint from Con-
gress, but the fault quite often lies with the members of
Congress rather than the Executive. During the period 1969-
73, for instance, the National Security Council had a standing
offer to brief any member of Congress on whatever foreign
policy issue he desired. The ground rules for such briefings
were to provide the fullest and most highly classified informa-
tion on the issue, but to allow no transcript and to provide no
documents. According to the records of the NSC, this offer
was taken up only three times in five years."
Lehman-who later served as deputy director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and as secretary of the navy-also notes the
"very sparse attendance at committee hearings" on national security
issues, and says, "It is always difficult to round up an audience of any
number on Capitol Hill to hear executive branch officials brief on a
policy unless it is the crisis topic of the day."45
A greater congressional role in this vital area will not only increase
the demands on a member's time, it will also increase the likelihood
that he will be held accountable by the American people for foreign
policy failures. This is a serious risk, but it comes with the partnership
role. Following failure of the Iran rescue attempt, an article in the Na-
tional Journal noted: "There is also the question of how much leaders
of Congress really want to know about such risky ventures as the at-
tempted rescue of the hostages. If they had been briefed fully and in
advance in this case, they could have been held accountable, along with
the President, for the mission's failure. '4 6  More recently, Stephen
Chapman wrote:
The crisis in Lebanon shows the limits of Congress' new role.
Its idea of a partnership is to set policy when there is a polit-
ical advantage to be gained, and to shirk responsibility when
there are dangers. . . . A true partnership requires that Con-
gress not merely hold its veto over the President's head. Con-
gress also has to help formulate answers to tough questions
S. .. Congress enjoys exploiting its newfound power on the
44. Lehman, supra note 24, at 226.
45. Id
46. Nat'l J., May 4, 1980, at 740.
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easy issues-aid to El Salvador, CIA involvement in Angola.
But on the more divisive ones, where there are political risks
as well as benefits, it is happy to let the White House serve as
point man . . . . Once the President steps out, the dangers
can be gauged. Then, and only then, will Congress make up
its mind. That is how it thinks a partnership in foreign policy
ought to operate-with maximum risk to the President, and
maximum opportunity for legislators. Some partnership.
Some foreign policy.4 7
Finally, full congressional participation in the making of national
security policy will be impossible unless Congress finds a way to deal
with the intentional or inadvertent disclosure of classified or sensitive
national security information. To be successful, many operations are
totally dependent upon secrecy. In effect, they are vulnerable to being
"vetoed" by any individual who decides to go public with criticism.
The Constitution does not require-and no workable set of rules could
require-that sensitive national security operations have the approval
of every single member of Congress. Indeed, there is evidence that the
Founding Fathers expected that certain sensitive national security in-
formation would be denied to the Congress. Writing in The Federalist,
for example, John Jay wrote in 1788:
There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be ob-
tained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from appre-
hensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on
those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or
friendly motives, and there doubtless are many of both de-
scriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the president, but
who would not confide in that of the senate, and still less in
that of a larger popular assembly. The convention have [sic]
done well therefore in so disposing of the power of making
treaties, that although the president must in forming them act
by the advice and consent of the senate, yet he will be able to
manage the business of intelligence in such manner as pru-
dence may suggest.48
More recently, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. , the
Supreme Court noted:
[The President] has his confidential sources of information.
He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and
47. Chi. Tribune, Sept. 23, 1982.
48. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 434-35 (J. Jay) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
49. 229 U.S. 304 (1936).
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other officials. Secrecy in respect of information gathered by
them may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure
of it productive of harmful results. Indeed, so clearly is this
true that the first President refused to accede to a request to
lay before the House of Representatives the instructions, cor-
respondence and documents relating to the negotiation of the
Jay Treaty-a refusal the wisdom of which was recognized by
the House itself and has never since been doubted.50
In recent years-particularly after the Watergate scandals and the
accompanying investigation of intelligence abuses-Congress has been
provided considerably greater access to sensitive national security in-
formation than was previously the case. Yet, unless Congress acts with
a greater sense of responsibility, the executive branch must recognize
that information provided on sensitive operations will be subject to
"veto by leak" by any member. Following the Iranian rescue attempt
Senator John Glenn, a former marine officer, said: "If I were on the
raid, I wouldn't want it all over Capitol Hill."' I Although Senate For-
eign Relations Committee chairman Frank Church was among the first
to condemn President Carter for his failure to consult before the rescue
attempt, the National Journal observed: "The White House surely re-
calls the last time Church was told a military secret-United States dis-
covery of a Soviet brigade in Cuba-the first thing he did was call a
press conference."52
Clearly, if Congress expects to be provided the sort of sensitive
national security information necessary to contribute to an intelligent
policy decision, it must substantially improve its record of preserving
secrets. As Barbara Hingston Craig notes in a recent issue of the Jour-
nal of Policy Anaosis and Management:
Presidential decisions such as the rescue attempt [in Iran] are
made in light of data accumulated from highly classified intel-
ligence files. Security concerns, however, preclude the presi-
dent's sharing this information with members of Congress.
Congress has yet to organize itself in such a manner that it
can be trusted with sensitive information. . . . In the House,
for example, 17 of 22 committees deal with at least some as-
pects of foreign policy. In the Senate, 16 of 19 committees
have some jurisdiction over foreign policy. To keep 535 per-
sons informed who may feel free to disseminate what they
50. Id at 320.
51. Nat'l J., May 4, 1980, at 740.
52. Id
1984]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
learn thereby is clearly impossible. Nor is there any way at
present for the president to deal with a smaller representative
group. Changes in the last decade that have eroded the lead-
ership's power and that have fractionalized and disaggregated
the power of the body itself have worked to make it a collec-
tion of "loners. 53
Recently, former Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner
observed:
To a greater extent than with executive branch oversight, the
fear that information will leak may inhibit the agencies from
taking risks. The danger of leaks is particularly high because
the [congressional oversight] committees are larger than nec-
essary; sensitive material cannot be restricted to only a few
committee members. Moreover, secrecy goes against the grain
of most politicians .
One of the most discouraging phenomena I witnessed during my
years working with the Foreign Relations Committee was the disclo-
sure to the press of information provided by the executive branch
under injunction of secrecy. Indeed, on one occasion, in October 1975,
the committee voted to "declassify" and make public the texts of classi-
fied agreements submitted to the committee by the Department of
State. When Senator Robert Griffin-who had strongly opposed the
decision-informed his colleagues the following day that the action vi-
olated both statutory law and Senate rules, the committee hastily called
another meeting and voted to reclassify the documents it had already
released to the press.
55
Fortunately, in at least one area-intelligence-there is some evi-
dence that security measures have been improved. Congress has pro-
vided that the most sensitive operations are to be reported to only one
committee of each house, and impressive security measures have been
taken to reduce the likelihood of sensitive information being compro-
mised by those committees, but some problems still remain. 6 It has
53. Craig, The Power to Make War: Congress' Searchfor an Effectiie Role, 1 J. PoL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 316, 326 (1982).
54. Turner & Thibault, Intelligence: The Right Rules, FOREIGN POL'Y 129 (Fall 1982)
(emphasis added).
55. 121 CONG. REc. S17,548 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1975).
56. Until 1980, 10 congressional committees were informed about the most sensitive
covert intelligence operations. Today, only the two intelligence committees are by law auto-
matically given that information. See Craig, supra note 53, at 332 n.45. The situation has
improved significantly under the new rules, but problems remain. For example, several
reports in August 1981 suggesting that the CIA was seeking approval to assassinate Libya's
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been suggested many times over the years that Congress establish a
joint committee on national security-comprised of key House and
Senate leaders and representatives of each committee with major na-
tional security responsibilities-to represent the Congress in consulta-
tion with the executive branch on national security matters.57 This is
certainly worth considering. Something needs to be done-the stakes
are too high to permit the present arrangement to continue indefinitely.
One thing is clear. Nearly a decade of experience has demon-
strated that the War Powers Resolution has not been a useful tool in
facilitating improved executive-legislative cooperation in the formula-
tion of national security policy. Not only are many of its provisions
Muammar Qaddafi appeared to have originated with the House Permanent Select Commit-
tee on Intelligence. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, August 3, 1981, at 19. Not only was this errone-
ous information harmful to United States foreign policy interests in general, more
specifically it may have been instrumental in the reported decision by Libya to send "hit
teams" to the United States to assassinate United States leaders. In NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8,
1982, at 42-55, a cover story on alleged covert operations quoted congressional sources as
having
wondered pointedly whether the administration had used approval for plans to cut
off the flow of Cuban arms to rebels in El Salvador as a cover for a more reckless
plot to topple the Sandinistas. "This operation's just about out of control and peo-
ple are getting panicky," said one source.
Id Part of the problem is that attitude of some journalists. A congressman or staff member
who wouldn't think of directly disclosing classified information to an enemy spy might be
more willing to provide a few details to a sympathetic United States journalist-particularly
one who claims to already have much of the story, or one who might support the policy
preferences of his source. The dilemma which results is well illustrated by a Newsweek
article on covert action which acknowledged that a "nation with global responsibilities still
needs covert action as a third tool of foreign policy-one more forceful than diplomacy and
less hideous than war," id, at 55, but at the same time said: "Keeping secrets requires the
acquiescence, if not the connivance, of the press. . . . Even today, the news media will
generally suppress a story if publication would put lives at risk or expose a secret that is
indisputably vital to the national interest. Beyond that, some reporters and editors say that
they will withhold a story if the covert action in question strikes them as necessary, prudent
and moral." Id (emphasis in original). Thus the standard for destroying a sensitive na-
tional policy-which may in fact involve the lives or freedom of large numbers of people-is
whether a single journalist concludes that it is "indisputably vital" to the national interest.
Presumably this is based upon the assumption that all journalists will be aware of every
possible ramification of the operation in question. But even this standard-which would
give every knowledgeable journalist a veto over America's most sensitive national security
activities-is insufficient for Newsweek. Individual journalists should not only have a right
to disclose sensitive national security secrets-they have a duty to do so. Thus, the writers of
the Newsweek article wrote: "The press has no business making such value judgments. Its
role in an open society is to print the news, fully and fairly, not to calculate the incalculable
consequences and shave the truth a bit here and there." Id By this reasoning, the writer's
predecessors during the great wars were remiss in not publishing in advance the sailing
schedules and routes of United States troop ships and convoys.
57. For a brief summary of the various proposals for such a committee, see SULLIVAN
STUDY, supra note 10, at 273-75.
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clearly unconstitutional, but it is fraught with practical difficulties as
well. The limited consultation and the pro forma reports it has pro-
duced have done nothing to improve the relationship between the two
political branches in the important business of defending the United
States and promoting international peace and stability.5"
Barbara Craig noted that "there are no signs. . . that the resolu-
tion has been instrumental in bringing about a more cooperative part-
nership between the executive and Congress in regard to decisions
about the use of armed forces." She added:
The president has much to gain by developing a workable
procedure for comity with Congress with regard to foreign
policy. By involving that body, his own position could be
strengthened. His ability to act decisively in the world com-
munity would be greatly enhanced if it were known to be
based on the consent of Congress. And there's the rub. The
War Powers Resolution pits Congress and the president against
each other. 5 9
Not only does the Resolution pit the political branches against
each other, but it does so resoundingly and before the entire world-
with predictably damaging consequences. The proliferation of nuclear
arms and other weapons of devastating destructiveness of necessity
makes deterring a conflict a primary national security objective, and
winning only a clear second choice. In reality, in modem warfare there
may be no winners. Deterrence is a function of perceptions of capabili-
ties and, equally if not more important, perceptions of the national will
to employ those capabilities effectively.
The United States has made an inestimable contribution to inter-
national peace and security during the post-World War II era by con-
vincing potential aggressors that the costs of aggression will greatly
outweigh any perceived benefits. In part, this has been made possible
by the creation of regional security and collective defense arrange-
ments, perhaps the foremost of which is the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO). Peace has also been furthered by occasional
calculated saber-rattling by United States Presidents-from the Tru-
man Doctrine in the Mediterranean, Eisenhower in the Middle East
and Formosa, and Kennedy in Berlin and Cuba to Reagan in Central
America. When appropriate, particularly serious threats have been
58. For example, Senator Javits characterized the Ford Administration's reports as be-
ing "brief to the point of being.. . almost worthless from an informational point of view."
HOLT, supra note 6, at 21.
59. Craig, supra note 53, at 324 (emphasis added).
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met by both the President and the Congress through the enactment of
joint resolutions-putting friend and foe alike on notice that the United
States was united and fully committed to taking all necessary steps to
help its friends resist aggression.
Over many years, and through many crises, this approach proved
extremely effective in helping to keep the peace. But its success was
predicated upon the existence of two critical perceptions in the minds
of potential aggressors-that the United States was strong, and that it
would use all of its strength, if necessary, to prevent the success of ag-
gression. Tragically, during the past fifteen years decisions made
largely in the Congress have inadvertently led our adversaries to ques-
tion both of these perceptions. Of course, Congress has not done this
single-handedly. Numerous mistakes were also made in the executive
branch. At the time of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the United States
had an approximate twenty to one superiority over the Soviet Union in
deliverable nuclear weapons.6" By 1965, Secretary of Defense McNa-
mara concluded that the Soviets had given up on ever achieving nu-
clear parity with the United States,6 and on this premise requests to
Congress to fund strategic programs during the late 1960s were quite
modest. Most defense expenditures during the period were keyed to
the growing conflict in Vietnam, and the strategic focus was on arms
control agreements. The United States intelligence community was
also not without blame, as it substantially underestimated the Soviet
effort to close and even reverse the so-called missile gap. As a result,
between late 1966 and the opening of the SALT I negotiations in No-
vember 1969, the total number of United States nuclear delivery vehi-
cles decreased by forty-five, while those of the Soviet Union nearly
doubled.62 At the same time, substantially adverse trends were also
developing in the balance of conventional weapons.
63
However, the greatest harm, in this writer's view, was done by the
Congress. When it became politically expedient to be a Vietnam
"dove" (a transformation which not infrequently took on a strangely
retroactive character, so that legislators who had voted for the Gulf of
Tonkin Resolution and time and again to finance the war would sud-
denly proclaim with straight faces that they had opposed the war from
60. Turner, Legal Implications of Deferring Ratpcation of SALT !!, 21 VA. J. INT'L L.
750 n.16 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Turner on SALT II].
61. See, e.g., U.S. News & World Rep., Apr. 12, 1965, at 52 (interview with Secretary
McNamara).
62. Turner on SALT II, supra note 60, at 751 n.3 1.
63. See J. COLLINS, AMERICAN AND SOVIET MILITARY TRENDS SINCE THE CUBAN MIS-
SILE CRISIS (1978).
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the beginning), cutting the defense budget became something of a
sport, and members of Congress virtually stood in line to get an oppor-
tunity to challenge commitments to other states as well. The Senate,
for example, rather gratuitously passed the National Commitments
Resolution, putting the world on notice that the United States had no
national commitment to any country with which it did not have a for-
mally ratified treaty or other congressionally approved defense rela-
tionship.61 In a similar vein, shortly thereafter the Congress announced
to the world in section 8(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution that in the
event of an enemy attack on our closest NATO allies the President
would not have legal authority to commit United States forces unless
Congress decided to vote him that authority.
The Senate, in other words, essentially went full circle. It assured
the world's potential aggressors that the United States had no obliga-
tion to assist any country with which it did not have a congressionally
approved defense agreement, and it then joined the House in saying
that for the President to have the power to execute our solemn treaty
commitments he would need to seek the same type of formal congres-
sional approval that would be required to assist a state with which the
United States had no relations at all. This gave a new meaning to the
concept of a commitment.65
64. S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. Rac. 17,214-46 (1969).
65. Legal scholars may disagree about whether the NATO and similar treaties are self-
executing or require affirmative legislation from Congress before the President can commit
United States forces to assist a treaty partner in resisting aggression. Article five of the
NATO treaty provides in part:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them. . . shall be
considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an
armed attack occurs, each of them. . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked
by taking such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to
restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 4 Bevans 828, 34
U.N.T.S. 243.
Since under article VI of the Constitution, a treaty is equivalent to a statute as the
"supreme law of the land," a case can be made that the President can legally respond to an
armed attack on the United States, and thus can exercise his Commander-in-Chief powers
without first seeking congressional approval. 'On the other hand, article 11 of the NATO
treaty says in part: "This treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties
in accordance with their respective constitutional processes." North Atlantic Treaty, 63 Stat.
2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 4 Bevans 828, 34 U.N.T.S. 243. It could thus be argued that the
President cannot act under the treaty until Congress has affirmatively declared war or pro-
vided equivalent authorization. The War Powers Resolution supports this interpretation. It
is also supported by the writings of President Jefferson, who argued that while the President
and the Senate could change a state of war into a state of peace, "the Constitution expressly
requires the concurrence of the three branches to commit us to the state of war." XIV THE
WRaTrNGs OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 445 (A. Lipscomb & A. Bergh ed. 1905). Jefferson's
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Senate passage of the National Commitments Resolution re-
minded some observers of a January 1950 speech by Secretary of State
Dean Acheson outlining a United States defense perimeter that ex-
cluded South Korea.66 Pyongyang was apparently listening, because
within a few months more than 60,000 North Korean soldiers invaded
South Korea. At that point Acheson apparently decided that he had
been mistaken and that South Korea was worth defending. Nearly
34,000 United States soldiers lost their lives in rectifying that mistake.67
During the height of its anti-Vietnam irresponsibility, the Con-
gress ignored this lesson. Not satisfied with having assured our adver-
saries that genuine United States defense commitments were few-and
that those which existed were, legally speaking, essentially meaning-
less-the Congress began enacting other legislation limiting the Presi-
dent's flexibility in dealing with national security problems. According
to Senator Tower, during the 1970's "over 150 separate prohibitions
and restrictions were enacted on Executive Branch authority to formu-
late and implement foreign policy."' 68 Several of these laws virtually
guaranteed our enemies that the United States would not effectively
help to resist aggression in specific trouble spots like South Vietnam,
Laos, Cambodia, and Angola. It may have been coincidental, but it is
worth noting that upon enactment of those laws external communist
forces substantially escalated their activities, and each of those states is
today under Marxist rule.
Today, the War Powers Resolution continues to pit the Congress
against the President. In El Salvador, where President Reagan is val-
iantly trying to dissuade Moscow and Havana from underwriting the
overthrow of a popularly elected government, the prospects for mean-
ingful peace are being jeopardized by the War Powers Resolution. Vir-
view, while persuasive, is unnecessary to resolve this admittedly important question. NATO
was organized primarily to deter Soviet and other aggression. For purposes of deterrence,
what the United States could or would do under the NATO treaty is less important than
what the Soviets think it could or would do. By giving public notice of its views (rather than
privately conveying them to the President for the record), the Senate undercut at least some
of the deterrent value of NATO and other treaty relationships. In essence, the Senate was
stating that American's NATO allies had the same legal claim to United States military
assistance as any country. All would be totally subject to the whim of the Congress at the
moment help was necessary.
66. Acheson, Crisis in Asia-An Extension of U.S. Foreign Policy, 23 DEP'T ST. BULL.
111, 116 (1950).
67. See 123 CONG. REC. S9954 (daily ed. June 16, 1977) (statement of Sen. Griffin).
There were, of course many other considerations that led to the North Korean decision to
invade, but Acheson's remarks greatly reduced one of the most important disincentives to
the invasion.
68. Tower, supra note 16, at 234.
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tually every time the President speaks or acts firmly to deter the
communists, his congressional critics cite the War Powers Resolution
and tell the world-occasionally in language reminiscent of the old
Ludlow Amendment---"He can't do that!"
Needless to say, this continuing display of divisiveness reduces the
effectiveness of the President's efforts to deter Soviet and Cuban ag-
gression. If the President's efforts at deterrence fail, America's long-
term options would appear to be (1) watching feebly from the sidelines
as Moscow and its well-armed clients subvert our neighbors to the
south one by one or (2) eventually committing United States combat
troops to a costly re-establishment of that national credibility which is
the sine qua non for effective deterrence. If these are in fact our op-
tions, supporting the president at this time in an effort to deter aggres-
sion appears increasingly attractive.
Since its passage over a presidential veto in 1973, a number of
members of Congress have expressed serious concerns about the consti-
tutionality or practicality of the War Powers Resolution.6 9 Even Sena-
tor Frank Church, as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, expressed doubt about the ability of Congress to restrain
the Commander-in-Chief by statute and concluded: "I wonder really
whether we have done very much in furthering our purpose through
the War Powers Resolution."7
If Congress does not take the lead and repeal the resolution, the
Reagan Administration would be wise to reassess its own public pos-
ture toward the statute. While the President's apparent effort to avoid a
confrontation over the constitutionality of the Resolution is in many
respects commendable, it may not be wise in the long run. The promi-
nent constitutional scholar Charles Warren has written:
Under our Constitution, each branch of the Government is
designed to be a coordinate representative of the will of the
people. . . .Defense by the Executive of his constitutional
powers becomes in very truth, therefore, defense of popular
rights-defense of power which the people granted him.
It was in this sense that President Cleveland spoke of his
duty to the people not to relinquish any of the powers of his
great office. It was in that sense that President Buchanan
stated the people have rights and prerogatives in the execu-
tion of his office by the President which every President is
69. See SULLIVAN STUDY, supra note 10, at 272.
70. HOLT, supra note 6, at 39.
[Vol. 17
SYMPOSIUM
under a duty to see "shall never be violated in his person" but
"passed to his successors unimpaired by the adoption of a
dangerous precedent." In maintaining his rights against a
trespassing Congress, the President defends not himself, but
popular government; he represents not himself, but the
people.71
If a future President concludes that it is necessary to ignore some of the
Resolution's unconstitutional provisions, congressional critics can be
expected to rely heavily upon any tradition of acquiescence by prior
Commanders-in-Chief. The proper constitutional balance will there-
fore fare better if there is a well-established public record of presiden-
tial failure to recognize the validity of certain provisions of the statute.
The constitutional and practical difficulties posed by the Resolu-
tion also give Congress a strong incentive for readdressing this issue.
The large majority of those who voted in 1973 to override the Presi-
dent's veto of the War Powers Resolution are no longer in the Con-
gress.72 Now that its failure has been demonstrated and the acrimony
resulting from Vietnam has receded, Congress could take a valuable
first step in the direction of improved legislative-executive cooperation
in this vital area-and in the process reaffirm its commitment to consti-
tutional government-by repealing the War Powers Resolution.
71. A. BRECKENRIDGE, THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OVER IN-
FORMATION 165-66 (1974).
72. SULLIVAN STUDY, supra note 10, at 265.
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